Colorado Court of Appeals Judge: Elizabeth L. Harris

What the commission said

The State Commission on Judicial Performance finds that Judge Elizabeth L. Harris, by vote of 9-0 with one commissioner absent, and one commission vacancy, MEETS PERFORMANCE STANDARDS. Colorado’s statutory judicial performance standards are integrity, legal knowledge, communication skills, judicial temperament, and service to the legal profession and the public.

The Commission finds that her opinions are clear, well-written, and reasonably timely. At oral arguments, she is well-prepared, succinct in her questions, respectful, and seeks to draw out the issues most important to the Court’s decision-making process. Judge Harris received positive comments from lawyers about her preparation, intelligence, familiarity with the record on appeal, and knowledge of the law. Lawyers noted the length of time required for Judge Harris to issue an opinion as a weakness. Judge Harris received positive comments from fellow judges for her writing ability, her thoughtfulness and her engagement in committee work for Colorado Courts. Judges also noted Judge Harris’ timeliness in issuing decisions as a weakness. The Commission commends Judge Harris for her commitment to community service and the Court of Appeals/Supreme Court summer internship program. Such efforts beyond the daily work of the Court of Appeals demonstrate dedication to serving the legal profession and the public. In sum, the Commission finds Judge Harris to be a valuable member of the Court of Appeals.

To conduct our evaluation, the Commission interviewed Judge Harris, reviewed her self-evaluation, observed oral arguments, read a selection of her legal opinions, and considered survey responses from attorneys and judges. The Commission received survey responses from only 5 attorneys and 22 judges. Nevertheless, the Commission is confident in this opinion because 93% of responding judges and attorneys agreed, and all remaining sources of information available supported a finding that Judge Harris “Meets Performance Standards.”

Judge Harris is a graduate of Georgetown University and New York University School ofLaw. She began her legal career as a law clerk for the Honorable John Porfilio of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. After her clerkship, she spent five years at the Federal Public Defender’s Office in Colorado and then joined the law firm of Jacobs Chase, which was later acquired by Husch Blackwell. In 2013, she opened her own law firm where she focused on appellate litigation. She was appointed to the Colorado Court of Appeals in 2015.

The survey

The share of each group surveyed who said the judge meets performance standards.

• Attorneys100%
• Judges91%

Opinions

The judge's published opinions as CourtListener holds them, through Dec. 24, 2025.

Most cited

1. People v. Villanueva

   2016 COA 70, May 5, 2016, cited 1,327 times

   Opening paragraph

   In September 2005, Martin Villanueva was arrested for the murder of Benjamin Garcia-Diaz. The police and prosecutors maintained that Villanueva shot Garcia-Diaz, who was a drug dealer in Villanueva’s cocaine operation, because, in late 2004, Garcia-Diaz had been arrested, $30,000 worth of Villanueva’s drugs had been seized, and Garcia-Diaz was poised to cooperate with police. In fact, when Garcia-Diaz had failed to appear for his arraignment in March 2005, his lawyer, Charles Elliot, told the prosecutor that he presumed his client was the victim of a “drug related” murder.

2. in Interest of J.R

   2021 COA 81, June 10, 2021, cited 1,020 times

   The division's summary

   After a jury trial, the juvenile defendant was adjudicated delinquent for acts that if committed by an adult would constitute sexual assault on a child and indecent exposure. On appeal, he contends that the juvenile court plainly erred in allowing a medic al doctor to testify that, based solely on one of the child victim’s allegations, she had diagnosed that victim with “sexual abuse.” A division of the court of appeals holds that the doctor’s expert testimony impermissibly bolstered the victim’s credibili ty and usurped the jury’s role as fact finder. However, the division concludes that the error, while obvious, does not cast serious doubt on the reliability of the jury’s verdict. And because the division rejects the juvenile’s other argument concerning prosecutorial misconduct, it affirms the judgment.

3. People v. Madison

   2018 COA 62, May 3, 2018, cited 1,015 times

   The division's summary

   Pursuant to an agreement between the defendant and the prosecution in a theft case, the defendant was permitted to take possession of the stolen property if he paid restitution to the victims within a contractual period of time. The defendant did not pay the restitution and, five years later, the sheriff’s office moved for an order authorizing it to destroy the stolen property. Defendant objected, but the court granted the motion. On appeal, the defendant argues that he had an ownership interest in the stolen property based on the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and conversion principles. A division of the court of appeals concludes that the disposition of the stolen property is governed by the agreement, not by the UCC or conversion principles, and that the agreement allowed the sheriff’s office to destroy the stolen property when defendant did not pay restitution within the contractual period of time.

4. in Interest of M.H-K

   2018 COA 178, Dec. 13, 2018, cited 882 times

   The division's summary

   In this dependency and neglect proceeding, a division of the court of appeals holds that the juvenile court erred by incorporating the entire petition in dependency and neglect into its statement-of- the-case instruction under CJI-Civ. 41:1. The statement of the case instruction should be a short, non-argumentative summary of the Department’s claims. But the juvenile court’s instruction recited the history of the case from the perspective of the Department, including prejudicial inferences, references to inadmissible evidence, and allegations that were not proven at trial. Because the error was not harmless, the division reverses the judgment of adjudication and remands for a new trial. Additionally, because the issue may arise on remand, the division holds that the juvenile court also erred in admitting evidence of mother’s refusal to submit herself and the child to voluntary drug testing before the Department filed its petition.

5. People v. McFee

   2016 COA 97, June 30, 2016, cited 556 times

   Opening paragraph

   Jonathan Ray McFee was convicted of first degree murder in the stabbing death of his girlfriend, L.E. At trial, the district court admitted her prior statements to family members recounting McFee’s threats to kill her. The court also admitted a note written by L.E. shortly before her death in which she said that McFee had threatened her and predicted that he would eventually follow through on those threats.

Most recent

1. Caylao-Do v. Logue

   2025 COA 42, May 1, 2025, cited 11 times

   The division's summary

   In this negligence action, plaintiff sued defendant, a police officer, for damages sustained when the officer’s patrol car hit the plaintiff. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and awarded damages that exceeded the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA) cap. A division of the court of appeals holds that the constitutional exception to CRE 606(b)’s no-impeachment rule does not apply to an allegation that, during deliberations, a juror expressed anti-police bias. The division also concludes that any error in a trial court’s decision to sustain a party’s Batson objection, and thereby retain the juror subject to the objection, is harmless unless the striking party can show that the juror was not fair and impartial. Finally, the division confirms that the CGIA’s damages cap is inclusive of costs and prejudgment interest.

2. People v. Timothy Mark Gemelli

   Dec. 14, 2023, not yet cited

   The division's summary

   The defendant in this criminal case waived his right to counsel and proceeded pro se at trial. On appeal, he argued that his waiver was invalid because it was induced by his continued detention and his desire to avoid a continuance. And he contended that when it became apparent that his self-representation was ineffective, the trial court should have sua sponte intervened and ordered advisory counsel to take over the representation. A division of the court of appeals holds that a defendant’s waiver is not invalid merely because he is required to choose between waiving his right to counsel and another course of action — here, preserving a particular trial date. As long as the choice i s not “constitutionally offensive,” the waiver is not rendered involuntary. The division further concludes that even if the defendant’s self-representation is ineffective, the trial court is neither obligated nor authorized to sua sponte override a defendan t’s valid waiver of the right to counsel and require that he be represented by counsel.

3. Colorado Sun and Tegna, Inc., d/b/a KUSA-TV/9News v. Amanda Brubaker, in her official capacity as the Records Custodian for theColorado Department of Human Services

   2023 COA 101, Nov. 2, 2023, cited 2 times

   The division's summary

   In this case brought under the Colorado Open Records Act, §§ 24-70-201 to-230, C.R.S. 2023, several media organizations sought records showing the total number of child abuse reports received over a three-year period from certain residential care faciliti es. The records custodian for the Colorado Department of Human Services (DHS) denied the requests, citing a provision of the Children’s Code that prohibits disclosure of child abuse reports as well as “the name and address of any child, family, or informa nt or any other identifying information contained in such reports.” § 19-1-307(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023. According to DHS, disclosure of the requested aggregated information would necessarily reveal the address of a child or informant contained in a child abuse report because the requests were linked to specific addresses — the addresses of the residential care facilities. The question on appeal is whether section 19-1-307(1)(a) prohibits, under all circumstances, the disclosure of any address contained in a child abuse report or whether the statute prohibits disclosure of an address only when the address constitutes “identifying information” — that is, information that could lead to the identification of a particular child, family, or informant. After considering the statutory language, the legislative history, and the consequences of adopting eith er party’s construction, the majority concludes that the statute prohibits the disclosure of an address only if it constitutes identifying information. Accordingly, the division reverses the judgment and remands the case to the district court for a determ ination of whether the address in this case constitutes identifying information. The dissent concludes that under the plain language of section 19-1-307(1)(a), the address of a child, family, or informant contained in a child abuse report is always confidential and can never be disclosed.

4. People v. Justin Brendan Martinez

   Sept. 29, 2022, not yet cited

   The division's summary

   After the defendant in this criminal case was found guilty of reckless manslaughter, he appealed, arguing, among other issues, that the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury that the force-against-int ruders defense (known as the “make-my-day” defense) is an affirmative defense to reckless manslaughter. A division of the court of appeals holds that, like ordinary self-defense, the force-against-intruders defense is an affirmative defense only with respect to offenses requiring a mental state of knowingly or intentionally. Applying the reasoning of People v. Pickering, 276 P.3d 553 (Colo. 2011), the division concludes that the affirmative defense of force-against-intruders is inconsistent with conduct involving a reckless mental state, and, therefore, the trial court properly declined to give an affirmativ e defense instruction with respect to the reckless manslaughter charge.

5. Patrick Duray Portley-El v. Colorado Department of Corrections

   July 28, 2022, not yet cited

   The division's summary

   The plaintiff, an inmate, sued the Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging, as relevant to this appeal, that a DOC policy requiring inmates to use their “commitment name” violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalize d Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. While the litigation was pending, the DOC voluntarily stopped enforcing the challenged policy at the facility where plaintiff is incarcerated. The district court then dismissed the RLUIPA claim as moot. After analyzing the voluntary cessation exception to mootness, a division of the court of appeals concludes that plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim is not moot. And because the DOC is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the RLUIPA claim, the division rev erses the judgment and remands for further proceedings.